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Abstract 
Are holders of important ministerial positions more likely to survive in cabinet than their colleagues 
who hold less important positions? This study examines the relationship between the importance of 
a ministerial position and the length of time ministers are able to survive in government. It is based 
on an original dataset of cabinet ministers in seven West European countries from 1945–2011. Em-
ploying a little-used measure of ministerial survival based on overall time in government, we find 
that holders of important ministerial positions are more durable than their colleagues who hold less 
important ministerial positions. Age, prior government experience and the size of the party to which 
the minister belongs are also associated with consistently significant effects. Further, we explore the 
determinants of survival for two types of risk – exiting government with one’s party and exiting 
without it – showing that the effects of ministerial importance and other covariates are markedly 
different for these two types of exit. Our findings have important implications for our understanding 
of ministerial and governmental stability. 
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Introduction 
Holding senior ministerial office for an extended period of time is a central career ambition for 
many politicians. The length of time for which ministers are able to remain in government also has 
important implications for political stability and processes at the core of democracy. If government 
personnel change frequently then ministers may lack the time they need to get to grips with both the 
individual requirements of their position and the machinery of government in general (Rose 1971: 
406); they may also lack the capacity to respond to or represent voters effectively in the policymak-
ing process. If, by contrast, ministers are able to stay in government indefinitely, we might question 
the extent to which mechanisms of accountability and democratic scrutiny are fully functioning. As 
Fischer et al. (2012: 516) argue, ministerial duration tells us “at least as much about the govern-
ment’s accountability and stability as government durability”. 
In this study, we contribute to the developing literature on ministerial stability by exploring the rela-
tionship between individuals’ time in government and the importance of the ministerial positions 
they hold.
1
 In both theory and practice ministerial offices are not considered equal, with some asso-
ciated with significantly more power than others. On the basis of the principal-agent and coalitional 
relationships that characterize cabinet government in parliamentary democracies, we identify mech-
anisms that plausibly link ministerial importance and duration in government. Our main hypothesis, 
developed on the basis of this discussion, suggests that holders of more important ministerial posi-
tions are more likely to stay in office longer. We examine this link empirically by comparing the 
time spent in government by cabinet ministers in seven West European parliamentary democracies 
between 1945 and 2011. Our findings support the hypothesis that ministerial importance and dura-
tion are positively related: holders of important ministerial positions tend to survive for longer. 
However, we show that the determinants of survival in government differ markedly for individuals 
who leave government with their parties and individuals who leave government without them.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by identifying determinants of ministerial tenure and we 
establish our central hypothesis. We then present our operationalisations of ministerial importance  
and ministerial stability, discussing in particular how our measure of stability diverges in important 
respects from existing work and why this is important. In the analysis, we model the impact of min-
isterial importance on survival in government. We conclude by highlighting the contribution made 
                                                 
1
  A ‘ministerial position’ is the office or collection of offices held by an individual at any one time. In the context of 
this article, ‘ministerial importance’ refers to the importance of the ministerial position held. 
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by this study to contemporary work on ministerial careers and present some avenues for further re-
search suggested by it. 
Ministerial importance and survival in government 
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary systems can be understood as a chain running from 
voters to parliament and from parliament to the prime minister (or government) with delegation 
continuing to individual ministers through to their ministries (see especially Berlinski et al. 2012, 
Ch.2 for a review and discussion; also Hansen et al. 2013: 229-30; Strøm et. al. 2010). Formally, 
ministers’ immediate principal in this chain is the prime minister, meaning that the prime minister 
enjoys a significant degree of control over who becomes a minister. In some contexts they may have 
sole control, although it is widely accepted that parties often add another layer to these principal-
agent dynamics, with party leaders playing a key role in ‘hiring and firing’ ministers, especially in 
the context of a coalition (Dowding and Dumont 2009; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008: 171).  
Party leaders and prime ministers also have the power to decide when to end a minister’s tenure. 
Exit from government, however, is not determined by ministers’ principals alone. First, ministers 
can end their own time in government by choosing to resign or retire. Second, ministers’ parties 
play a dual role: as well as being their effective principals, they provide the basis for the minister’s 
career in government. Their defection from coalition or loss of office has implications for their min-
isters’ tenure. Indeed, if we assume that ministers do not switch parties, their party’s continued 
presence in cabinet is a necessary condition for their own survival in government.  
The key actors that determine both the start and end of a minister’s time in office within this setting 
are therefore the prime minister, the minister’s party and the minister themselves. Each of these key 
actors may be influenced by the importance of the position held by the minister.
2
 The principal-
agent framework suggests that principals (both parties and prime ministers) may experience prob-
lems of adverse selection (they may choose the wrong agent) and moral hazard (agents may act 
against their interests). We expect therefore that they should seek to minimize these problems 
(agency loss) by screening appointees before delegation. The incentive to conduct such screening is 
likely to be stronger when the ministerial position in question is more important (Berlinski et al. 
2007: 259-60; Hansen et al. 2013: 23; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008: 171-2).  
                                                 
2 
 In this discussion, we aim to identify a wide range of potential mechanisms. Empirically identifying all of these 
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we hope that this discussion might form a basis for their 
identification. 
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That a minister holds a more-important position should also provide incentives to retain that minis-
ter in cabinet. After delegation, dismissing the holder of an important ministerial position may re-
flect poorly on the principal, as this is a more serious admission of poor judgment in selection than 
dismissing the holder of a less-important position. The prime minister will also take into account 
the overall stability of their position, and that of their government: the more politically important 
the position held by the individual, the more destabilizing their dismissal is likely to be for policy 
and for any negotiated inter- (or intra-)party equilibrium. Moreover, holding a less-important minis-
terial position increases the relative value of the agent’s options outside of cabinet (see also Berlin-
ski et al. 2007: 259). Hence, ministerial resignations and party defections are plausibly influenced 
by the importance of the ministerial office(s) held. All else being equal, the more important the of-
fice, the greater the costs of leaving office for both parties and individuals.  
There are of course reasons to expect that, under certain conditions, principals may also have great-
er incentives to dismiss holders of important ministerial positions. Holders of important positions 
handle more consequential and difficult issues and hence will face more scrutiny by a range of other 
actors, including parliament and the public, via the media (Berlinski et al. 2007: 259).
3
 They may 
also face greater scrutiny from their own colleagues in cabinet and in their own department (for ex-
ample, junior ministers – see e.g., Thies 2001) acting as mutual checks. Prime ministers may view 
holders of more-important ministerial positions as credible rivals and therefore as targets for exclu-
sion from power when the opportunity arises.  
On balance, however, we expect individuals who hold more important positions to survive for long-
er in government, which leads to our hypothesis:  
The greater the importance of an individual’s ministerial position, the more likely they are to sur-
vive in government. 
Of course, there are factors other than ministerial importance that can affect an individual’s time in 
government by influencing the decisions of their principals, their party or themselves. The age of a 
minister can be important, as prime ministers may want to “rejuvenate” their cabinet at certain 
points (Dowding and Dumont 2009: 14), meaning older ministers become gradually more likely to 
be replaced; and ministers will also eventually reach the age of retirement. On the other hand, min-
                                                 
3
  The Home Office, for example, is one of the most important ministerial positions in the UK, but it is also regarded 
as a “graveyard” for political careers, because of its responsibility for highly sensitive matters relating to crime and 
immigration, and the ease with which things can go wrong. Under the recent period of Labour government (1997-
2010), no less than six different Home Secretaries were appointed. Likewise, Fischer et al. (2012: 515) point to the 
reputation of defence portfolios in Germany and Australia as “ministerial graveyards”. 
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isters with previous experience may be more adept at handling a crisis and therefore more likely to 
survive. While Bakema (1991: 71-6) argues that neither age nor parliamentary experience account 
for variation in the duration of careers of individual ministers, other studies (e.g., Berlinski et al. 
2007) have found that age and experience are associated with reduced survival.  
Another personal factor of potential importance is a minister’s gender. The underrepresentation of 
women in political office is well known: there are far more male members of parliament and minis-
ters than there are female ones (see Krook and O’Brien 2012). But it may be that the women who 
do obtain ministerial positions also face discrimination during their ministerial career, and are there-
fore less successful at retaining office. That said, Berlinski et al. (2007: 258) find the opposite: the 
female ministers in their sample (in the UK) tended to survive for longer than their male counter-
parts.  
Party- and country-level factors also affect the prospects of ministerial survival. The size of the par-
ty to which the minister belongs is important: smaller parties should be less durable in government, 
while larger parties are likely to offer their ministers longer survival times (Schofield and Sened 
2006: 3-4; see Brancati 2005 on regionalist parties). Existing research has also pointed to the struc-
ture of the party system as an important factor. Bakema argues that a smaller number of parties in 
the party system makes the formation of smaller coalitions more likely, providing additional stabil-
ity (see Bakema 1991: 82-3). Larger cabinets (i.e., more ministerial positions), meanwhile, offer 
greater scope for reshuffling rather than removing ministers, enhancing ministers’ prospects of sur-
vival in government. 
Finally, given the important role of political parties in ministerial careers as necessary conditions for 
ministerial survival, we expect that the determinants of ministers’ exits while their party remains in 
government may be quite different from the determinants of ministerial exits that result from a coa-
lition party’s defection or from its failure to hold onto office. Thus, in addition to examining the 
variables outlined above, we investigate the following secondary research question: are determi-
nants of tenure different for ministers that leave with their party and ministers that leave without 
them? In relation to this question, and in the absence of an existing body of work on parties’ surviv-
al in government (although see Tavits 2008 and Warwick 2012 on the distinct but related question 
of defection), our study is exploratory. 
Measuring position importance and duration in ministerial office 
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In this section, we set out our approach to the measurement of the two key variables in our study: 
the importance of a ministerial position and the length of time a minister remains in it. Existing 
studies provide some initial support for our expectation that the importance of a ministerial position 
is related to the amount of time ministers are able to remain in it (Bäck et al. 2012: 200; Berlinski et 
al. 2007; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008: 176). However, these studies have used relatively in-
exact measures of the importance of these positions. Berlinski et al. (2007) employ a four-part ordi-
nal scale of different government positions in the UK (from whip to cabinet member), but they do 
not distinguish between individual ministerial positions. Studying presidential cabinets in Latin 
America, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005: 833; see also 2008) develop country-
invariant groupings of high-, medium- and low-prestige ministries based on a qualitative assessment 
of their control of policy and patronage, financial resources, prestige and visibility. Huber and Mar-
tinez-Gallardo (2008) use a dichotomous variable, based on Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert survey, 
to distinguish the top two ministries from seven other less-important ministries.
 
 To more fully 
measure the variation in the importance of different positions, and in line with Hansen et al. (2013; 
see also Bäck et al. 2012: 202), we employ data from an existing expert survey on portfolio salience 
to create an aggregate score for each minister based on the number and type of portfolios they hold 
(the exact process of this aggregation is described more fully below). 
 
Our most significant departure from the existing literature on ministerial durability is in the meas-
urement of survival in office. Conventionally, studies of ministerial durability have measured time 
in office within individual cabinet terms, with the end of a cabinet being defined by events such as 
changes in prime minister, general elections and a party leaving government (amongst others). On 
the other hand, mainly descriptive studies that focus on “career aspects and mere time in office” 
measure ministers’ continuous spells in office, ignoring technical terminations brought about by 
these ‘cabinet-ending’ events (Fischer et al. 2012: 508-509; see also Bakema 1991; Frognier 1991: 
119-120; Jäckle 2013; Verzichelli 2009: 90).  
A second way in which studies of ministerial tenure can vary is in respect of their focus on tenure 
within a single ministerial office (e.g., Hansen et al. 2013; Huber and Gallardo-Martinez 2008; Qui-
roz-Flores 2009) or, alternatively, continuous survival within government as such. As Quiroz-Flores 
acknowledges (2009: 131), measures that focus on tenure in a single office do not distinguish be-
tween ministers who exit government and ministers who are moved around within government, in-
cluding those who are promoted to a higher office. Nor do they take into account their time in cabi-
net before attaining a particular ministry.  
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These variations in operationalisations of the dependent variable speak to particular theoretical con-
cerns: survival in a single office corresponds to a general concern with ministerial movement or 
“general cabinet instability” assuming that dismissal, resignation, promotion and demotion all gen-
erate instability (Hansen et al. 2013: 235). Measuring tenure within a cabinet term facilitates a focus 
on prime ministerial management between elections (see e.g., Berlinski et al. 2012: 14). Many stud-
ies feature measures of ministerial stability that have both of these characteristics, focussing on 
ministerial stability in single positions within cabinet terms (e.g., Bäck et al. 2012: fn.54; Berlinski 
et al. 2012: 65; Hansen et al. 2013; see also contributions to Dowding and Dumont 2009). 
--- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
These measurement decisions have important empirical implications. Take, for instance, the early 
ministerial career of Brian Lenihan Senior, who was in government in Ireland continuously from 
November 1964 until March 1973. He was Minister for Justice from 1964 until 1966 under two dif-
ferent prime ministers and during two legislatures. Then, between March 1968 and March 1973 he 
consecutively occupied three different positions within one cabinet: Education, Transport and Pow-
er, and Foreign Affairs. In summary, he occupied four different ministerial positions and was a 
member of three different cabinets during this period. Table 1 illustrates the implications of varying 
the ways in which his tenure is measured. The number of spells in office identified ranges from one 
spell of approximately eight years and four months (in the bottom-right cell) to six spells of be-
tween three months and three years and seven months (in the top-left cell). This example is illustra-
tive and not all spells in office are as long and varied as this one. However, it is notable that 43% of 
spells in office in our data set (see description below) span more than one ministerial position, indi-
cating that these variations in measurement have implications far beyond isolated cases. 
The focus of our study is somewhat different from the concern with ministerial movement and 
prime ministerial management that underlies the most common way of measuring ministerial tenure 
in the literature (i.e., tenure in one position and within one cabinet). We assume that the most im-
portant distinction in a ministerial career is the distinction between being in government and being 
outside it, rather than the distinction between being moved (up, down or out) and not being moved. 
We also assume that survival in government through elections and prime ministerial changes is im-
portant. We suggest that ministerial tenure, measured in this way, has important implications for 
background concerns that frame the study of ministerial careers. 
Take political stability, for example: exits from government are a significant indicator of instability, 
arguably more so than ministerial movements more generally. For studies that focus on survival in 
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government (rather than ministerial movements or individual prime ministers’ management strate-
gies), this means that conventional measures of ministerial survival are often truncated. This has 
further implications for variance in the dependent variable, as it ignores long, multi-position or mul-
ti-cabinet spells in government and artificially inflates the number of short spells in office. In the 
context of existing studies of ministerial durability, our approach to ministerial survival opens up 
the question of whether existing results concerning the effect of ministerial importance (Bäck et al. 
2012; Berlinski et al. 2007; Hansen et al. 2013; Huber and Gallardo-Martinez 2008) and other co-
variates are robust to a different dependent variable. In other words, does ministerial importance al-
so matter for ‘mere time’ in government? 
Ministerial careers in seven West European democracies 
Cross-country analyses have only very recently entered the study of ministerial durability due to 
limitations in the availability of (digital) data on ministerial appointments, portfolio allocation and 
personal characteristics. Here we study ministerial duration for a number of stable parliamentary 
democracies with coalition cabinets over the entire post-war period. Our data includes full ministe-
rial appointments in seven West European countries from 1945 to 2011: Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden. Ministers who were already in office in 1945 had that 
particular spell backdated to their entry into government, eliminating any problems of left-
censoring. The approach allows us to move beyond single country studies and to derive some cross-
country findings while still being able to apply more fine-grained measures of portfolio importance 
and personal characteristics than other large-n cross-country comparisons. 
The countries studied are similar in several respects: they are long-established democracies, a dis-
tinction that appears to have important implications for ministerial stability; all are parliamentary 
democracies, which further limits variation (see Fischer et al. 2012: 510-1 for a short review of 
these factors); and each has had a broadly proportional electoral system during this period. These 
permissive electoral rules lead to regular instances of coalition government with small parties in 
cabinet. In other respects, the countries provide diverse settings in which our hypothesis can be test-
ed (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 301-2). They vary in important constitutional and political charac-
teristics, such as the role of additional veto players in ministerial selection and deselection that con-
strain prime ministers, the presence of both single-party and coalition governments (Dowding and 
Dumont 2009: 13; see also Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008: 172-3), the fragmentation of the 
party system, the frequency of elections and whether ministers are expected to be experts or gener-
alists (see also Bakema 1991: 95; Bakema and Secker 1988; Blondel 1980; Dowding and Dumont 
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2009: 11-12; de Winter 1991). They also vary widely in country size, which is associated with the 
apparent number of ministerial career scandals (Fischer et al. 2012: 515; Kristinsson, 2009: 200; 
Fischer et al. 2006). Government formation rules are both positive, in Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, and negative, in Sweden, Austria, Iceland, Finland (Strøm et al. 2010: 525). Some of the sys-
tems have important subnational governments, which can provide external career options (Dumont 
et al. 2009: 138), while others do not.
4
 They are also known to be diverse on the dependent varia-
ble, ranging from Luxembourg’s notable ministerial stability to the rapid turnover of Finnish minis-
ters before the 1990s (Bakema 1991).  
--- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
Table 2 summarizes the individual-level variables that we use in our analysis by country (see Ap-
pendix A3 for party- and system-level variables). The dependent variable is the amount of time an 
individual spends, uninterrupted, as a cabinet minister. This may include multiple appointments to 
different ministerial positions, and can span multiple consecutive cabinets. The data set covers 
1,654 such spells in government. The duration of the average spell in government is 3.6 years, alt-
hough this varies quite widely (sd = 3.4). National averages (from 1.8 years in Finland to 5.9 years 
in Luxembourg) also vary considerably. Several countries (Sweden, Luxembourg, Germany, Aus-
tria) have average spells in government that exceed the country’s average inter-election period, in-
dicating the empirical significance of measuring the dependent variable across multiple ministerial 
positions and multiple cabinets. Of the 1,654 spells, 27% represent an individual’s second or subse-
quent spell in government; 84% are occupied by men; and 7% encompass a period in the prime 
minister’s office. The mean age at the beginning of a spell in office is just under 50 (a value that is 
consistent with earlier cross-national studies – see e.g. Bakema 1991: 71) and this is remarkably 
homogenous across the seven countries: every national average is within two years of the overall 
average (see Appendix A3). 
For our main independent variable, we use data from an expert survey on portfolio salience that 
provides the best available cross-nationally comparable data on ministerial importance in Western 
Europe from 1945-2000 (Druckman and Warwick 2005). Druckman and Warwick provide scores 
for most portfolios in the countries their survey covers. They asked country experts to rate the im-
portance of different ministerial portfolios in their own country, relative to an “average” ministerial 
portfolio with an importance value of 1.0. This results, for example, in prime ministerial positions 
                                                 
4
  Their diversity further highlighted in the variation that we observe between countries in respect of the variables 
included in our analysis (see table 2 and Appendix A1). 
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being considered to be two to three times as important as an average portfolio. For our study, we 
aggregate country expert scores on portfolio importance for particular ministerial positions based on 
the respective portfolios included in the position. In common with Hansen et al. (2013; see also 
Bäck et al. 2012: 202), our approach leads to a continuous measure for the importance of every in-
dividual ministerial position, moving beyond binary and ordinal scales used in existing work. How-
ever, we also correct for sources of systematic bias by weighting the raw portfolio scores in the data 
and by assigning default values for missing portfolio information (see Appendix A2 and Bright et 
al. 2012: 11-16 for details).  
The average importance of positions held by a minister during their spell in office is 1.31: here, the 
variation in national averages ranges from 1.13 in Germany to 1.82 in Luxembourg. In the data a 
one unit difference equates to a large variation in ministerial importance. By way of illustration, a 
one-unit difference approximates the difference between the prime minister’s office and the follow-
ing offices in each of the seven countries: Trade in Austria; Foreign Affairs in Germany; Education 
in Iceland; Health in Ireland; Public Works in Luxembourg; and Health and Social Affairs in Swe-
den (Druckman and Warwick 2005: 37-41). 
We also include several party- and system-level variables in our data set. These include party size 
measured as percentage seat share in the lower house of parliament, the party’s left-right position, 
measured on an eleven-point scale, using the mean value of a number of expert surveys (Döring and 
Manow 2012); the size of the cabinet measured as the number of ministerial positions available in 
the cabinet; the number of parties in government; and the effective number of parties, calculated us-
ing the seat distribution in parliament (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). These variables are summa-
rized by country in Appendix A1. 
--- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
Figure 1: Survivor function by ministerial importance (n=1654) 
 
Modeling importance effects 
We model ministerial duration using techniques drawn from event history analysis (see Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004), which has become the standard choice for recent studies of ministe-
rial careers (e.g. Berlinski et al. 2007; Hansen et al. 2013; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Qui-
roz-Flores 2009). A Kaplan-Meier survival curve provides a first indication of the relationship be-
11 
 
tween ministerial importance and survival in government (figure 1).
5
 The graph shows that minis-
ters holding positions of below-average importance have a lower probability of survival than their 
colleagues who hold more important positions and a log-rank test confirms that this difference is 
statistically significant (Mills 2011: 80-1). The curve also shows when these divergences take place. 
Up to around four years there is a small but significant difference between survival rates for holders 
of ministerial positions of above- and below-average importance. After about four years, the differ-
ence between the groups widens considerably, indicating that those holding positions of relatively 
low importance find it especially difficult to survive beyond one legislative term. This provides 
some prima facie indication that the main hypothesis is supported. 
We now present a fuller analysis of the impact of ministerial importance on tenure (see table 3). Our 
model of choice is the Cox proportional hazards model, which allows us to estimate the effect of 
multiple independent variables on the ‘hazard rate’ of a given minister. The hazard rate can be de-
fined as the chance ministers have of being removed from their post at any given point in time.
6
 The 
most useful feature of this model is that it makes no assumption about the underlying shape of the 
hazard being modeled, which would be difficult for us to specify in advance (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Zorn 2001: 975). The coefficients for each variable can be interpreted as a percentage effect on 
the hazard rate, with those above 1 indicating an increase in the rate, and those below 1 indicating a 
decrease, for every unit change in the variable in question (Mills 2011: 94-5). For example, in mod-
el 1, for every additional year in the age of a minister at the start of their office, their hazard rate is 
increased by 1%, meaning that the probability of survival is reduced. The results of our analysis are 
summarized in models 1 to 5, shown in table 3. Model 1 is our baseline model, which includes all 
explanatory variables, while models 2 to 4 represent modifications made to test and improve on the 
validity of our findings. Model 5 allows us to account for differences in ministerial tenure and party 
exit from cabinet. 
--- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
Several aspects of the baseline model 1 are important to discuss. The importance of a ministerial 
position has a positive relationship with duration (a negative effect on a minister’s hazard rate) that 
is highly statistically significant, reducing their likelihood of being removed from office by around 
27% for every one point increase in importance, lending support to the main hypothesis of our 
study. Likewise, being prime minister at any point during a ministerial spell in office also increases 
                                                 
5 
 For legibility the confidence intervals have been omitted.  
6
 We use the “Efron” method for handling tied data, which is appropriate when there are a large number of ties, as is 
the case in our model (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 54-8). 
12 
 
the likelihood of duration (reducing the hazard rate). As expected, increases in both the number of 
parties in government and the size of the minister’s party increase the chances of survival, while the 
effective number of parties at the last election is associated with reduced chances of survival. 
In model 1 all covariates are coded in a ‘time invariant’ fashion. This represents an approximation 
only, as most of the variables in question do change while the minister is in office. For example, if a 
minister changes position, their corresponding importance score will change as well. In order to 
deal with this problem, model 2 introduces time-varying covariates. We split up our observations 
into month long periods, resulting in a dataset with approximately 76,000 person months. In each 
period, all time-varying covariates are remeasured. Only gender and previous experience (a dummy 
variable) remain time-invariant. These remeasurements are then ‘lagged’ by a month to control for 
problems of causal ordering, although the value for the first month remains necessarily the same. 
The major impact of model 2 is to diminish the statistical significance of the ‘prime minister’ varia-
ble.  
Model 3 makes adjustments to model 2 on the basis of a test of the validity of the proportional haz-
ards assumption, which Box-Steffensmeier and Jones call “the primary concern when fitting a Cox 
model” (2004: 131). A Cox model assumes that the effect of individual covariates remains at the 
same level over time (i.e., that the effect of gender in the first year of office is the same as that in 
the fifth year of office). If this assumption is violated, coefficient estimates become unreliable. Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones recommend using Grambsch and Therneau’s global proportional hazards 
test as a way of validating this assumption (2004: 137). The results of this test show that model 2 is 
indeed in likely violation of the assumption (see Appendix table A2). In order to compensate for this 
problem, model 3 stratifies model 2 on the basis of three variables which seem to have particularly 
disproportionate effects: the effective number of parties in parliament, the number of parties in gov-
ernment, and cabinet size (number of ministers). Two strata are created for each variable, divided 
around the median value. We aimed to keep the number of strata as low as possible in order to re-
tain an acceptable number of observations in each category. Further tests of the proportional hazards 
assumption on model 3 show that the model is now performing acceptably (see Appendix A3). The 
impact of stratification on the results is very small, with little notable change. 
Thus far models 1 to 3 have assumed that all observations are independent from each other. This is 
often a strong assumption, and especially so in the case of ministerial careers. In theory at least, 
ministers are related to each other in a number of ways, most importantly by cabinet membership 
and party affiliation, whilst their country of origin also provides a shared context. It is likely that 
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these relationships will have consequences for a minister’s hazard rate. Descriptive statistics in ta-
ble 2, for example, show that there are significant differences between ministerial survival times 
across countries. In order to control for this potential interdependence, we estimate a ‘nested’ shared 
frailty model (model 4). Shared frailty models allow us to account for unobserved subgroup hetero-
geneity that might be caused by factors such as party membership, and have been successfully ap-
plied in other studies of ministerial careers (see Bäck et. al. 2012: 194; Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo 2008). Nested shared frailty models allow for subgroups to be divided into further groups, 
following a logic identical to that of multilevel analysis. In model 4, we adjust for the effects of par-
ties nested within countries. We chose not to include cabinet membership because individual careers 
often span multiple cabinets, while shared frailty modules should restrict each individual to mem-
bership of one group per level. Given the theoretical importance of differences across party and 
country groupings and given the diversity among the countries included in the analysis, it is perhaps 
surprising that model 4 is largely consistent with the results reported in model 3, the only major dif-
ferences being diminished statistical significance for some of the variables, including ministerial 
importance. 
Models 1 to 4 take a ‘pooled risks’ approach to ministerial survival. That is to say, all types of min-
isterial termination are treated as the same event, and hence are assessed in the same framework. 
However, there are good reasons to question such an approach. In particular, as discussed above, 
ministers who exit the cabinet because their party has left the government (either because the party 
defects or loses office) seem to experience a different type of event than those who leave while their 
party remains in power (i.e., those who resign or are dismissed). To assess this possibility, models 
5a and 5b report the results from a ‘competing risks’ model based around the ‘latent survivor time’ 
approach (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 168-9). Model 5a focuses on ministers who left of-
fice without their party: these are resignations and dismissals. Those who left office with their party 
are treated as censored observations. Model 5b focuses on those that left office at the same time as 
their party, censoring observations that ended in exit from office without the party. This isolates the 
effect of individual variables in increasing the hazard for a particular type of risk. In all other re-
spects, both models are the same as model 4.  
Models 5a and 5b present markedly different results. With the partial exception of prime ministerial 
status, the coefficients for each covariate point in different directions in each of these models. This 
is an empirical indication that these two types of exits from government are quite different process-
es and that the timing of these two types of exit has different determinants. Model 5a, which focuses 
on exits from government without the minister’s party, resembles models 1 – 4 in many respects. 
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The main hypothesis receives support: important ministers are protected from dismissal and resig-
nation. This result reflects the nature of the mechanisms that we expected to underpin the positive 
effect of importance on the likelihood of survival in government (see theoretical discussion above). 
It is clear that they should account better for individual exits than for party defection or events at 
which parties otherwise lose office.  
Male ministers and members of smaller parties are also protected from this type of exit in model 5a. 
This may reflect the greater influence that male politicians have traditionally had within their par-
ties, even controlling for the importance of their ministerial positions. The greater susceptibility of 
holders of more-important positions and male ministers to exit with their party (in model 5b) like-
wise indicates their capacity to lead their party out of government. The significant coefficient for 
party size in model 5a points to the fact that ministers (especially party leaders) in small parties are 
better-able to take their party with them when they leave government, while bigger parties with 
more ministerial positions have more potential to shuffle around ministers within their party’s min-
isterial contingent rather than dismissing them. Interestingly, there is also a large and significant co-
efficient for party position on the left-right axis, which points in opposite directions in models 5a 
and 5b. This is something which we had little theoretical reason to expect, but it appears that minis-
ters in parties further to the right have a greater hazard of resignation or dismissal whilst in govern-
ment. This finding may indicate that these parties are less internally stable than their counterparts 
further to the left.  
How robust is the relationship between ministerial importance and survival in government over 
time? Druckman and Warwick’s (2005) data are the best available measures of ministerial im-
portance with cross-national scope. The long time period covered by the data provides some confi-
dence that importance scores reflect the value of individual positions, rather than the importance of 
specific officeholders. However, one of their potential weaknesses is that, although ministerial posi-
tions are reconfigured over time, the portfolio salience values provided by Druckman and Warwick 
are time-invariant. It is quite reasonable to argue that this is implausible: that important portfolios in 
the 1960s may be less relevant today, or vice versa.
7
 Hence, we test the robustness of our main find-
ing over time. We do so by re-estimating model 1 for three different periods (1945-1970; 1970-1990 
and 1990-2011; see appendix A3). Each period contains approximately 500 spells in government 
and the coefficient for ministerial importance is 0.80, 0.62 and 0.65, respectively, with each being 
statistically significant. Likewise, reestimating model 4 for the three periods produces coefficients 
                                                 
7
  Hansen et al. (2013, 236), in response to this criticism, point out that these measures do (in conjunction with party’s 
seat contribution) predict inter-party portfolio allocation over time. 
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of 0.79, 0.90 and 0.87 for these periods, albeit with only the first of these being statistically signifi-
cant (the full results of these models are produced in appendix A3). 
Empirical findings  
Our study leads to several important findings. Firstly, we have shown a positive and consistently 
significant relationship between the importance of a ministerial position and their survival in gov-
ernment. The more important the position, the longer they are able to remain in government. In par-
ticular, ministerial importance protects them from dismissals and resignations that are unrelated to 
their party’s exit from government. These findings  reinforce the principal-agent perspective on 
ministerial selection that emphasises the need to reduce agency loss through screening of candidates 
and highlights that the level of this screening may vary with the importance of the position. It also 
adds to a small body of cross-national research on ministerial durability (c.f. Hansen et al. 2013; 
Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008) by specifying a new dependent variable (survival in govern-
ment) and a refined measure of the main independent variable (ministerial importance).  
Secondly, a variety of personal level variables, such as age, gender and previous experience influ-
ence survival in government according to our findings. In particular, we have demonstrated a strong 
association between increased age and a higher probability of exit from government (an increased 
hazard rate), supporting conclusions in other (mostly single-country) studies (e.g. Berlinski et al. 
2007). We reach different conclusions to Berlinski et al.’s study of the UK in terms of gender how-
ever: the men in our study have a significantly higher survival rate once we take a competing risks 
approach, indicating that although in general women might survive for longer in government, they 
are also more likely to be sacked or to resign between elections. The findings we produce on gender 
and ministerial survival complement the focus of current research on gender and ministerial selec-
tion (Annesley et al. 2014). 
Thirdly, the analysis confirms that the party to which the minister belongs clearly makes a differ-
ence. As we expected, the size of a minister’s party is positively associated with survival, even 
when taking into account the decreased risk of loss of government office at elections for larger par-
ties (which we examine through a competing risks model). The left-right position of the party also 
has an impact when examined in the competing risks models, with ministers that represent parties 
further to the right facing increased risk of resignation or dismissal but reduced risk of their party 
losing or leaving office, although we lack a theoretical explanation as to why this might be the case. 
The analysis, especially model 5b, has highlighted both the timing of party exits from government 
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and the differences between parties further to the left and those further to the right as areas for fur-
ther study. 
Fourthly, at the country-level, a higher number of parties in the party system is associated with re-
duced survival time, as expected, but a higher number of parties in government is associated with 
increased survival time, contradicting Bakema’s (1991) hypothesis about smaller coalitions provid-
ing additional stability for ministers. As we know, cabinet stability is distinct from ministerial sta-
bility: governments can fall whilst ministers remain in power. Also at the country-level, the appar-
ent protection offered by large cabinet size may reflect the latitude that this offers for shuffling min-
isters rather than removing them. However, we are unable to confirm these country-level findings as 
system-level variables are stratified out of models 3-5.  
Conclusion 
Our study contributes to several developing facets of the literature on ministerial careers. Firstly, 
following Fischer et al. (2012) it draws attention to important varieties of dependent variable in the 
study of ministerial tenure that have received little attention in the existing literature. It applies a lit-
tle-used measure of ministerial tenure (uninterrupted survival in cabinet) that has important implica-
tions for individual politicians and for the political systems in which they play a part. Secondly, the 
study employs the best measure of ministerial importance currently available in a study on ministe-
rial careers, which allows more accurate estimates of the effect of ministerial importance on minis-
terial tenure. Thirdly, the study presents one of the first analyses that investigates individual deter-
minants of ministerial survival across countries, hence moving beyond single country studies that 
still dominate the field. Finally, we have pushed the boundaries of ministerial career research by 
employing a competing risks model that separates the causes of leaving cabinet with one’s party 
from the causes of leaving cabinet without one’s party. This highlights that further development of 
the conventional principal-agent framework accounting for the dual nature of parties as both princi-
pals and as platforms for ministerial careers may be necessary. This is particularly important for 
studies that examine ministerial time in office that can span several cabinets. 
We demonstrate that ministerial importance has a robust effect on tenure. The more important a 
minister’s position, the more likely he or she is to remain in office. This finding is robust to various 
modelling strategies, different specifications of ministerial importance and to controlling for con-
textual variables and personal characteristics of each minister. It adds to established findings that 
have demonstrated the impact of office importance on tenure in single party (Westminster) cabinets 
(Berlinski et al. 2007), to work that focuses on cabinet and portfolio level variables (Huber and 
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Martinez-Gallardo 2008), and to other studies that analysed this relationship using different opera-
tionalisations of the independent and dependent variables (e.g., Hansen et al. 2013). However, our 
study does also highlight that there is a relationship between ministerial importance and party exit 
from coalition cabinet that has received little attention in existing work. Our analysis suggests that 
more important ministers are able to draw their party out of government coalitions. 
The timing of party exits from coalition government and its connection to ministerial careers merits 
further investigation. In this respect, one of our models (model 5a) highlights an important lacuna 
and indicates that more important ministers can take their party out of cabinet. However as of today, 
the theoretical mechanisms that link coalition dynamics and ministerial tenure are ill specified and 
are in need of appropriate principal-agent models. The literatures on defection (e.g., Warwick 
2012), strategic dissolution (e.g., Strom and Swindle 2002) and cabinet stability (e.g., Saalfeld 
2008) may provide starting points for theoretical development. In order to empirically identify the 
mechanisms proposed by this paper, further studies, including comparative case studies, are re-
quired.  
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APPENDIX:  
 
This appendix provides some more details about the collection and coding of data used for the 
study, and reports results from a check of the ‘proportional hazards’ assumption in the final model. 
A1: System- and party-level variables 
 
--- TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 A2: Data Collection and Coding 
 
Here we provide a short introduction into our data infrastructure; a full account is provided in 
Bright et al. (2012: 11-16). Our tenure data is based on Lars Sonntag’s Politica website 
(www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson), which lists ministerial appointments for a wide variety of countries 
covering the complete timespan of interest. A computer programme was written which allowed the 
data on the website to be systematically harvested and then inserted into the Parlgov database (Dö-
ring and Manow 2012); it was then augmented with other information (such as birth dates) which 
was itself harvested from a variety of sources. This automatically-entered data was both cleaned (to 
remove minor typographical errors) and checked by hand using a variety of different official gov-
ernment websites and publications for the countries in question (see Bright et al. 2012: 7-8). The 
data on Sonntag’s website for the countries covered here was found to be of a high quality with only 
a few minor errors relating to dates of ministerial entry or position held. 
The raw data is compiled in a database distinguishing separate entities such as persons, ministerial 
spells, portfolios and external data (including Druckman and Warwick 2005). Ministerial spells are 
recorded for each ministry and individual cabinets. All ministries are linked to portfolios solely 
based on the name of the ministry. A Ministry for Culture and Sports would include two portfolios. 
Our ministerial data is also linked to the Parlgov data infrastructure on parties, elections and cabi-
nets (Döring and Manow 2012) allowing us to derive information about parties and party systems in 
the countries we study.  
The actual data set we use for the study presented is generated by various software scripts. With the 
help of these scripts we aggregate ministerial appointments into single spells in cabinets and 
measures of portfolio salience into importance scores for ministries. We combine all uninterrupted 
periods in cabinets into a single observation including reappointments and changes of ministerial 
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responsibility. Short breaks of less than two weeks are however ignored. For every ministerial spell 
we calculate the importance of all ministries controlled by an individual based on ministries 
weighted by duration within the spell. 
Ministerial importance scores are based on portfolio measures in Druckman and Warwick. Some 
portfolios in our dataset did not match precisely to a portfolio in Druckman and Warwick’s survey 
for that particular country. In this case, we used either a portfolio score which matched approxi-
mately (e.g. “Trade” was often matched to “Commerce”), or we used a default score which was set 
at the 25th percentile of all scores in the country (see Bright et al. 2012: 13). Portfolios are aggre-
gated into ministerial positions based on the following formula. 
∑
𝑥𝑖
2𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=0
 
where n is the number of portfolios, and x is the importance score for each individual portfolio, in 
decreasing order of importance. This corrects, at least partly, for obvious inflation of the importance 
of ministers that hold multiple portfolios that results from the simple aggregation of portfolios 
(Bright et al. 2012, 14-15). Figure A1 summarizes information about the distribution of ministerial 
importance scores across our countries. 
--- FIGURE A1 ABOUT HERE --- 
Figure A1: Distribution of Ministerial Importance Scores 
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A3: Proportional Hazards Assumption 
 
This section provides supporting information for the check of the proportional hazards assumption 
carried out on models 2 and 3. Table A2 reports the results of a Grambsch-Therneau proportional 
hazards test for these models. The low global test statistic for model 2 provides strong reasons to 
think this model is violating the assumption (conventionally anything under 0.05 is considered 
problematic). Three variables (effective number of parties at the last election, number of parties in 
government and cabinet size) have particularly low test statistics as well. These variables were strat-
ified out of model 2 (as described in the paper) to produce model 3. The results of the Grambsch-
Therneau test show a global statistic of 0.05, which is borderline but acceptable in terms of the pro-
portional hazards assumption; whilst no other individual variables show problems with the assump-
tion. We therefore can have confidence in the figures reported in model 3 onwards in the main pa-
per.  
--- TABLE A2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
A4: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Broken Down by Time Period 
 
--- TABLE A3 ABOUT HERE ---- 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Illustrating differences between measures of ministerial tenure: the early career of Brian 
Lenihan Snr., Ireland 
 Tenure in: 
Temporal 
boundaries 
One position Government 
Within cabinet 
term 
1964-1965 
1965-1966 
1966-1968 
1968-1969 
1969-1973 
Early 1973 
1964-1965 
1965-1966 
1966-1969 
1969-1973 
None (overall 
time) 
1964-1968  
1968-1969 
1969-1973 
Early 1973 
1964-1973 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for individual-level variables by country 
Country 
N (spell 
in govt.) 
Mean sur-
vival in govt, 
years (sd) 
Previous experi-
ence (% obs. in 
country) 
Gender: male 
(% obs. in 
country) 
Mean im-
portance (sd) 
PM (% obs. 
in country)* 
Mean age at 
start in years 
(sd) 
Austria 194 4.5 (3.5) 14 (7%) 155 (80%) 1.33 (0.40) 10 (5%) 49.7 (7.3) 
Finland 468 1.8 (1.8) 172 (37%) 396 (85%) 1.34 (0.58) 34 (7%) 49.1 (8.5) 
Germany 221 4.9 (3.4) 20 (9%) 190 (86%) 1.13 (0.42) 8 (4%) 51.4 (7.9) 
Iceland 150 3.8 (3.0) 40 (27%) 130 (87%) 1.29 (0.60) 20 (13%) 50.4 (8.6) 
Ireland 272 3.5 (3.0) 126 (46%) 258 (95%) 1.40 (0.56) 19 (7%) 50.0 (9.0) 
Luxembourg 103 5.9 (5.0) 28 (27%) 87 (84%) 1.82 (0.49) 8 (8%) 49.8 (8.1) 
Sweden 246 4.2 (4.1) 38 (15%) 170 (69%) 1.13 (0.38) 11 (4%) 49.1 (8.0) 
All  1654 3.6 (3.4) 438 (27%) 1386 (84%) 1.31 (0.53) 110 (7%) 49.8 (8.3) 
* At any point during a spell in office. 
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Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazards Models 
 
 Model 1:  
Baseline Model 
Model 2: Time 
Varying Covari-
ates 
Model 3: Strati-
fied Model 
Model 4: Nested 
shared frailty 
model 
Model 5a:  
Competing Risks 
– Left without 
Party 
Model 5b:  
Competing Risks 
– Left with Party  
Importance 0.73(0.06)*** 0.82(0.07)** 0.84(0.07)** 0.86(0.07)* 0.92(0.01)*** 1.12(0.02)*** 
Gender (male) 1.00(0.07) 0.98(0.07) 0.95(0.08) 0.94(0.08) 0.83(0.01)*** 1.31(0.02)*** 
Age 1.01(0.00)*** 1.02(0.00)*** 1.02(0.00)*** 1.02(0.00)*** 1.02(0.00)*** 0.98(0.00)*** 
Previous Expe-
rience 
1.56(0.06)*** 1.41(0.07)*** 1.32(0.06)*** 1.20(0.07)** 1.05(0.01)*** 0.93(0.02)*** 
Prime minister 0.67(0.12)*** 0.88(0.14) 0.83(0.14) 0.82(0.13) 1.00(0.02) 0.94(0.03)* 
Size of party (% 
seats) 
0.99(0.00)** 0.99(0.00)*** 0.99(0.00)*** 0.99(0.00)* 0.99(0.00)*** 1.01(0.00)*** 
L-R party posi-
tion 
1.02(0.02) 1.01(0.02) 0.99(0.02) 1.03(0.05) 1.61(0.04)*** 0.89(0.02)*** 
Cabinet size (no. 
of ministerial 
positions) 
0.97(0.01)*** 0.96(0.01)***     
ENP after last 
election 
1.62(0.04)*** 1.64(0.04)***     
No. parties in 
govt. 
0.85(0.02)*** 0.84(0.02)***     
N (spells in 
govt.) 
1654 1654 1654 1654 992 662 
*** = p < 0.001** = p < 0.01* = p < 0.05 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for system- and party-level variables by country  
Country N (Spell 
in govt.) 
Effective 
Number of 
Parties (sd) 
Cabinet size: 
number of 
portfolios 
(sd) 
Parties in 
govern-
ment. (sd) 
Party seat 
share % (sd) 
Left-Right 
position of 
party (sd) 
Austria 194 2.69(0.64) 14.69(2.25) 2.48(0.66) 41.57(10.48) 5.2(1.64) 
Finland 468 5.02(0.38) 13.58(3.15) 4.59(1.01) 21.57(7.33) 5.19(1.35) 
Germany 221 3.37(0.59) 18.58(2.48) 3.94(1.02) 29.08(15) 5.42(1.38) 
Iceland 150 3.82(0.48) 13.13(3.11) 3.58(1.13) 26.9(9.84) 4.76(1.74) 
Ireland 272 2.9(0.37) 18.86(3.3) 3.63(1.28) 40.17(15.01) 5.79(0.97) 
Luxembourg 103 3.48(0.42) 22.78(7.84) 2.95(0.57) 32.8(9.38) 5.83(1.42) 
Sweden 246 3.65(0.47) 19.59(5.68) 3.64(1.46) 33.01(15.64) 4.78(1.71) 
All 1654 3.77(0.98) 16.67(4.96) 3.76(1.28) 30.86(14.15) 5.26(1.48) 
 
 
Note: The unit of observation here is that used in model 1 of table 3, i.e. an individual spell in cabinet for a minister
Table A2: Grambsch-Therneau Proportional Hazards Test 
 
Variable Name P Values Model 2 P Values Model 3 
Importance 0.76 0.26 
Gender Male 0.03 0.25 
Age  0.90 0.14 
Previous Experience 0.90 0.60 
Is Prime Minister 0.06 0.32 
Size of Party (% of seats) 0.56 0.09 
Left-Right position of party 0.09 0.27 
Effective Number of Parties at last election 0.00  
Number of Parties in Government 0.00  
Cabinet Size (no. ministerial positions) 0.00  
Global 0.00 0.05 
 
  
1 
 
Table A3: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Broken Down by Time Period 
 
Model 1 Table 3, broken down by time period 1945-1970 1970-1990 1990-2011 
Importance 0.80 (0.10)* 0.62 (0.10)*** 0.65 (0.12)*** 
Gender (male) 0.64 (0.20)* 0.96 (0.14) 1.04 (0.11) 
Age 1.01 (0.01)* 1.01 (0.01)* 1.01 (0.01) 
Previous Experience 1.69 (0.11)*** 1.44 (0.10)*** 1.33 (0.14)* 
Prime minister 0.65 (0.18)* 0.85 (0.21) 0.54 (0.28)* 
Size of Party (% of seats) 0.99 (0.00)** 1.01 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Left-Right position of party 1.04 (0.03) 1.07 (0.03)* 0.95 (0.03) 
Effective Number of Parties at last election 1.92 (0.08)*** 1.86 (0.07)*** 1.28 (0.08)** 
Number of Parties in Government 0.77 (0.04)*** 0.79 (0.05)*** 0.91 (0.04)** 
Cabinet Size (no. ministerial positions) 0.99 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01)*** 0.98 (0.01)* 
    
Model 4 Table 3, broken down by time period 1945-1970 1970-1990 1990-2011 
Importance 0.79 (0.12)* 0.90 (0.11) 0.87 (0.14) 
Gender (male) 0.69 (0.21) 0.97 (0.15) 1.02 (0.12) 
Age 1.02 (0.01)*** 1.02 (0.01)*** 1.02 (0.01)** 
Previous Experience 1.05 (0.12) 0.84 (0.11) 1.08 (0.15) 
Prime minister 1.03 (0.21) 0.84 (0.23) 0.54 (0.34) 
Size of Party (% of seats) 0.97 (0.01)*** 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
Left-Right position of party 1.08 (0.07) 1.01 (0.08) 0.97 (0.07) 
 
